This
page is still under constructionThis
text is a very long text.
However it will tell you a part of history that you almost for sure
do not know.
In our opinion it will turn to be very actual and could help you to
see how south south routes were established ( Natal China etc over
Africa ).
At the time the US needed to get to the China etc ( to fight Japan
).This time it could be
about the Chinese getting to South America ( Brazil, Argentina etc
), North America ( US etc ) ( for commercial reasons ).
To see the source of this text go to :
http://www.tau.ac.il/eial/VI_2/mccann.htm
Brazil and World War II: The Forgotten Ally.
What did you do in the war, Zé Carioca?
FRANK D. McCANN
University of New Hampshire
World War II had great impact on Brazil.
The war effort improved its port facilities, left it with new modem
airfields from Belém to Rio de Janeiro, as well as refurbished
railroads, stimulated manufacturing, agriculture, and mining, and
a burgeoning steel complex.
Its army, air force, and navy had gained combat experience and the
latest equipment.
Its foreign stature had reached new heights and its leaders foresaw
an ever greater role in world politics.
The war era laid the foundations upon which Brazil's remarkable development
in the next half century took place.In
1945, Brazil's then 40,000,000 people ( MHIP : now almost 200,000,000
people or five fold ) had ample reason to be proud of their
country's contributions to the Allied victory.
Oddly, even though Brazil hosted, at Natal, the largest United
States air base outside its own territory, and, at Recife, the
U.S. Fourth Fleet; and even though it tied its economy to the American
war machine, sent its navy in pursuit of German U-Boats and provided
an expeditionary force and a fighter squadron on the Italian front,
Brazil in some mysterious fashion has been lumped in popular memory
abroad as pro-Nazi.
In January 1942, Brazil broke relations with the Axis ( MHIP :
Nazis ) at the Rio conference, and entered the war officially
in August of that year, unlike Argentina, which declared war when
Germany was collapsing in late March 1945.
Even so, Brazil's image in the United States, and presumably the rest
of the world, was muddled.Hollywood
films had something to do with the muddling.
The war years saw Carmen Miranda starring in eight of her fourteen
films and, although the studios labeled her the "Brazilian Bombshell,"
the films tended to blur her Brazilian identity in favor of a generalized
Latin American image.
Walt Disney created the talkative green parrot, Zé Carioca,
to symbolize Brazil, opposite the very American Donald Duck, in his
1944 films Saludos Amigos and The Three Caballeros.
Yet in 1946, Alfred Hitchcock set his atomic spy thriller, Notorious,
in Rio de Janeiro.
Cary Grant and Ingrid Bergman joined forces to prevent German agent
Claude Rains from spiriting atomic sands out of Brazil.
And decades afterwards, a late-1970s novel and movie about a plot
by Nazi fugitives to clone genetically a new Hitler carried the catchy
title The Boys from Brazil!
It is possible to suspect something more sinister than confused images
in the timing of Notorious and The Boys...
In 1945 the United States had signed a multi-year agreement with Brazil
to obtain cheaply several thousand tons of monazite and thorite for
use in its atomic energy program and, in 1946, Washington was concerned
with rising Brazilian nationalism that might contest such sales. (
MHIP : Brazilian and Indian monazite dominated the industry before
the Second World War.
With declining interest in thorium as a potential nuclear fuel in
the 1960s and increased concern over the disposal of the radioactive
daughter products of thorium, bastnaesite came to displace monazite
in the production of lanthanides due to its much lower thorium content.
However, any future increase in interest in thorium for atomic energy
will bring monazite back into commercial use. )And
in the mid-1970s, the United States government strenuously opposed
Brazil's nuclear exchange accord with West Germany.
The heat of the latter dispute was indicated by President Ernesto
Geisel renouncing Brazil's alliance with the United States in 1977.
To muddle Brazil's image would have been logical, in such circumstances,
if the objective was to rally public support in the United States
for a confrontation.
I know of no documentary evidence that there is more than coincidence
in the timing and subject matter of the two films and the contemporary
relations between the two countries; however, it is a curious concurrence.It
is a rare book on the war that mentions the Brazilian bases, the strategically
important Natal-Dakar air route, the naval campaign in the South Atlantic,
or the Brazilians in Italy.
Most war histories do not even have an index entry for Brazil.
It is remarkable how many times I have been asked by otherwise knowledgeable
people:
"Didn't a lot of Nazis escape there after the war?"
Perhaps the poor geographical knowledge of Americans causes them to
confuse one South American country with another.
They regularly confuse Brazil and Argentina, and think that Buenos
Aires is the Brazilian capital.
During a visit to Brazil, President Ronald Reagan stumbled during
a speech in Brasilia saying that he was pleased to be in "Bolivia,
eh... Bogotá... Brazil."
Brazil chose the Allied cause, even as it worked to obtain the greatest
benefts from both sides.
It was Brazil that ceded bases, harnessed its economy to the "Arsenal
of Democracy," and sent its military into combat, while Argentina
stood aloof.
These facts demand repeated mention because they are what inform Brazilian
post-war expectations and foreign policy objectives.
Brazil's status during the war was different from that of its neighbors,
and its leaders then and since have expected the great powers to understand
that. They have often been disappointed when the powers, especially
the United States, did not accord proper recognition.
Policy makers in foreign capitals, especially Washington, have frequently
been puzzled by, what they considered, the Brazilians' pretensions.
Their perplexity was perhaps feigned at times, because such recognition
was not in harmony with their own policy objectives, but it is likely
that often they were, like the world at large, ignorant of the history
of Brazil's wartime roles.
Fifty years after the conflict's end, it is time that Brazil's war
record reach a greater audience.Brazil's
Strategic Vision of its Position in the 1930sIt
would be easy to suppose that Brazil of the 1930s was so poor and
unorganized that it was simply pushed hither and yon by the powerful
international currents of the decade; that its leaders merely responded
to external forces and demands, and did not have a firm grasp on the
country's relative capabilities vis-a-vis neighbors and distant powers.
Such an assumption would be wrong.
After the regime and military collapse that occurred during the Revolution
of 1930, the federal government headed by Getúlio Dornelles
Vargas reorganized the national political structure and rebuilt the
federal army. As part of that process, it organized its first modern
military intelligence service during 1933-34. Brazil sent military
attaches to various "interesting countries." An early result
of this effort was a detailed study of Brazil's "military situation,"
which would provide a basis for the military and foreign policies
in the years prior to World War II.
2 A summary of this document will give the reader some insight into
the strategic thinking of the Brazilian leadership and suggests that,
for all the apparent internal divisions among the élites, Brazilian
policy ultimately was based on a coherent and realistic appraisal
of the country's relative strength and position in South America and
in the world.The analysts
observed that the great powers were shaken by internal economic and
social crises that had unsettled the world order and had produced
a "reciprocal and permanent distrust (italics sic) that made
any durable agreement impossible."
As a result, "Brazil as an ally could be pulled into another
world war, or it could be the cause or theater of a war... In fact,
over South America in general and over Brazil in particular there
loom serious threats, because various expansionist currents (italics
sic)..." converge here, among which are:
"
" the Japanese - the most dangerous, because it is the most systematic
and methodical, the most absorbent and best directed;
" the Germanic - existed before the European conflagration [WWI]
and which threat broke out again with the wave of intensive racist
spirit (italics sic) and scientific-military philosophy;
" the North American - that is above all economic, not threatening
directly our political independence, but tending to make us vassals.
American expansion, that is done principally by means of the exportation
of capital and via commerce in general (italics sic), tends to clash
here with the Japanese, that is carried out by the export of labor,
whose effect is more radical and dangerous.
The collision of those two currents could result in an attack against
our independence or, at least, against our integrity;
" the Italian - that by its origins and nature is less dangerous,
has accumulated, however, too much in certain regions of the country,
tending indirectly to threaten a break in the national unity of the
people, and to exercise strong influence on part of public opinion
in event of a European war."
The German immigrants could similarly endanger national unity and
resolve (p. 5).
In case of an "extra continental" (italics sic) war, Brazil
could only defend itself with a preventative policy. Internally, it
would have to control the immigrant population, spreading it throughout
the country to avoid concentrations of those with the same origins,
neutralizing direct assistance from foreign governments, forbidding
foreign colonization companies, insisting on obligatory teaching and
use of Portuguese, and imposing an "intense nationalization"
(italics sic) of those born in Brazil to cut their ties to the countries
of origin.
Externally, Brazil would have to make alliances. No one South American
country, the general staff analysts noted, in the next two or three
decades, would have sufficient military strength to fend off a great
power aggressor. lf the bigger South American countries allied, they
would have enough military power to make "difficult, expensive,
and dubious, attempts at conquest by any method (italics sic)."
This idealized South American alliance should involve development
of military industries and a continental system of communications.
Alas, the analysts lamented, the history of South American disputes
and rivalries made such an alliance unlikely (p. 6).The
authors reminded their superiors that Brazil, as the only Portuguese-
speaking country in the hemisphere, was isolated and so could only
count on itself.
Although the United States was similarly alone vis-a-vis the Spanish-
speaking countries and although their commonality as outsiders had
led to a "more or less intimate cooperation" in the past,
expanded United States influence would not be "without grave
inconveniences" (p. 6). "Economically we are their dependents,
because they buy our principal product in much greater quantities
than all other countries, while we buy relatively little from them."
Furthermore, coffee was not a necessity and in wartime it could be
obtained elsewhere.
The United States, the report warned, "could itself constitute
a threat for us... depending on the evolution of its post-war international
policy" (p. 7).All
this meant that Brazil had to organize its military power, which would
"liberate it from North American dependence (italics sic), without
prejudicing an even greater closeness (aproximando) with the great
confederation of the north, thereby satisfying, in broader fashion,
the necessities of national defense."
The analysis warned that, in case of war, "without the aid of
the United States or of another strong industrial power, the situation
of any South American nation is precarious, because none of them possesses
sufficient military industries" (p. 7).
And, in the meantime, as Brazil developed its industrial capabilities,
its defense against extra-continental aggression, lay in "preventative
measures" (sic), principally diplomacy (p. 7).If
a new war followed the pattern of the great war of 1914- 18, "our
position is naturally on the side of the Entente, especially if Argentina
and the United States line up on that side."
However, the report cautioned that Brazil "should not assume
an attitude diametrically opposed to that of Argentina, which could
cause a war with that nation, and for which we are not prepared"
(p. 8).This threat analysis
shows that as early as 1934, Brazilian authorities were measuring
the dangers that were accumulating on the world scene and were carefully
considering how best to protect the country.
In summary, the Brazilian leaders believed that they had to depend
on their own wits and resources, and that they should use the crises
that lay ahead to obtain the greatest advantage for Brazil.
However, when considering a possible world war and the problem of
equipping and preparing its armed forces, the Brazilian military and
presidential papers repeatedly point to the United States as logical
source.3There were also
domestic reasons for wanting to build up federal military power.
The Revolution of 1930 had pushed aside the oligarchic, state-based
coalitions that had controlled the political system since the late
1890s, but the danger of a rising of remnants of the old system was
always latent.
And new threats based on foreign models and inspiration appeared as
the decade wore on. In 1932, the Sáo Paulo élite led
that state into a these-month rebellion; in 1935, a Moscow-directed
communist uprising held Natal for a few days, and in 1936-37, greenshirted
fascist-inspired Integralistas marched and fought with leftists in
the streets. In order to contain such internal threats, the central
government wanted its military forces strengthened. Only then, proponents
argued, would the corrosive political problems be checked and the
work of national development carried forward. The military and presidential
archives hold documents that discussed these problems and their solutions.
Eventually, the major political solution would be the November 1937
internal government coup that suppressed the 1934 constitution, closed
the congress, and established the Estado Novo dictatorship that ruled
Brazil until October 1945.4 The foregoing analysis should be sufficient
to indicate that the Brazilian leadership prior to the war had linked
national development and security with international trade and finance,
and that they were concerned with not taking steps that would endanger
the country, but that internationally they saw themselves naturally
on the side of the liberal powers, particularly the United States.
Further, there was agreement among key leaders that the dangers that
afflicted the world also offered opportunities. Factions developed
as the world crisis deepened and opinions differed as to which side
offered the most with the least danger. For some observers, the internal
debates took on ideological coloring that muddied analysis.Pre-War
Struggle for Brazilian Markets, Resources, and SupportThe
failure of the world economy after the Wall Street Crash of 1929 led
to intense competition among Britain, the United States, and Germany
over access to Brazil's market and resources.
This rivalry was especially important for the latter two countries,
which had limited avenues into the vast areas of Africa and Asia that
were under colonial rule.
The United States turned to Latin America using the famous Good Neighbor
Policy and its companion reciprocal trade treaties as vehicles to
increase commerce, in order to stimulate the stagnated national economy.
Germany's vehicle to achieve the same end was the compensation mark
(Aski) system, a bi-lateral, blocked account arrangement that shut
out third parties. Shortly after Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed
the trade treaty (Feb. 1935) with the government of Getúlio
Vargas, the Brazilians made an agreement with Berlin to trade in the
Aski system as well.Washington's
desire for liberal trade policies based on purchases in hard currencies
was not matched in Rio de Janeiro or Berlin because both lacked such
currencies.
Brazil needed its scant hard currency reserve to support the Mibréis
(Cruzeiro replaced it in 1942), pay off foreign bond holders, remit
the profits of foreign companies, and finance purchases in the United
States and other countries. To obtain dollars, for example, the Brazilians
looked to the United States as the principal market for their coffee,
which, in the 1930s, was facing growing competition from Central American,
Colombian, and Venezuelan shippers.
That was why Germany was so appealing; there Brazil could enlarge
its exports and buy manufactures without spending hard currencies.
The Aski system allowed the Germany to offer lower prices than their
American or British competitors; indeed, the prices were more favorable
than those listed in Reichmarks. In 1938, Brazilian importers of German
goods paid Aski mark prices that were 24% less than those in Reichmarks.
In addition, Germans bought Brazilian cotton, wool, and fruits such
as oranges, which the Americans did not want.
And because Brazilian and American cotton competed directly in the
German market -indeed American losses reportedly had reached $20 million
in 1935-5, the Brazilians believed that the Roosevelt administration's
pleas for open trade were not as detached as the Americans professed.The
heart of the American-German conflict over the Brazilian market was
that Brazil's Aski-based sales obligated it to buy German products
that competed with American ones.
In effect, Brazilian competition cut into American cotton sales to
Germany, while the Aski-system reduced American sales to Brazil.
This aspect of the situation worried the Brazilians as well. By the
mid-1930s, the Vargas government had greatly weakened Britain's long-
time financial dominance over the economy and was attempting to create
an economic relationship with the United States that would give the
Brazilian economy access to American loans, investments, and markets,
while minimizing American influence. However, having enfeebled John
Bull's hold, the Brazilians were anxious to avoid Uncle Sam's grip,
and they did not want to give the Germans undue influence over their
trade policies. Their idea was simple and direct: by multiplying the
number of players, they would increase their ability to maneuver among
them; by expanding their markets and sources of supply, the economy
would be less dependent on a particular power and the political system
would be less vulnerable to foreign penetration. They wanted to trade
wherever possible, on whatever terms were agreeable; they were less
troubled about trade mechanisms than about finding markets and selling
goods. Their objective was economic independence, which they saw as
necessary to maintain political autonomy and to further economic development.The
Vargas government's skillful, clever, and nationalist maneuvering
built the foundation of today's robust industrial park.
Back then, few thought that Brazil would become the eighth-ranked
industrial economy in the world.
The 1935-1945 period provided opportunities for Brazil to make great
strides forward, and its leaders seized the chances with hard-headed
determination.
The tendency toward trade diversification, which so characterizes
Brazil's foreign trade in the 1990s, had its origins in the 1930s.
Then, as now, it was a common-sense way of minimizing risky dependence.
It was and is better to have more than one buyer and more than one
supplier.
( MHIP : that
is why Brazil has ties with China and USA amongs many others )The
difficulty for historians, of course, is that Nazi Germany was a major
actor in this story and dealings with the Reich raise suspicions of
sympathy and partisanship, particularly because, in November 1937,
Vargas ended the constitutional, elected government that he had headed
since 1934, and replaced it with the dictatorial Estado Novo.
American diplomats and intelligence agents saw the street parades
of the fascist-like, green shirted Integralistas (although not related
to the government and suppressed in March 1938), and the open admiration
for the German army of the Brazilian officers who backed the dictatorship,
as signs of Nazi influence.
Truly, trade does not take place in an ideological vacuum, but it
is well to recall that the United States government and American businesses
were working hard to expand their own access to the German market.In
the twentieth century, the Brazilian market has been important to
Germany under all of its regimes -imperial, Weimar, Nazi, occupied,
Bonn, and now reunified.
In 1938, Brazil was the biggest non-European consumer of German products
and ranked ninth among Germany's trading partners overall.
And Brazil's relations with it have been qualitatively different than
with the United States because, like its North American partner,
it received a large German immigration in the nineteenth century,
which gave Germany an influential base from which to operate.
The Americans lacked a similar base, immigration from the United States
having consisted of a few families of disgruntled Confederates.With
half a century of hindsight, it is obvious that Germany's trade was
supporting its preparations for war, but it should be equally obvious
that Brazil's leaders had no more idea than anyone else that Germany
would soon unleash the greatest war in history.
The point is that, until the war, none of the future allies abstained
from trade and other dealings with the Third Reich.6While
Brazilian importers bought a wide-variety of products in Germany in
1938-1940, they could not do so rapidly enough to maintain a balanced
exchange.
Extensive German purchasing stimulated certain sectors of the economy,
but caused the Bank of Brazil to amass a huge cache of Aski marks.
It was a delicate situation. In mid-1938 the Bank found itself holding
an excess of 30 million Aski marks and unofficially stopped authorizing
exports against the Aski account, and insisted that Germany pay for
cotton in hard currencies. The Germans threatened to buy elsewhere.
If Berlin fulfilled its threat, the producers of cotton, coffee, cacao,
tobacco, rubber, wool, woods, tropical fruits, hides, butter, and
iron ore would be seriously hurt. A few examples from 1938 will show
the importance of Germany's trade to the Brazilian economy. Where
coffee was Brazil's principal export to the United States, cotton
was the leader in its trade with Germany. Germany imported 1,211,182
bales of raw cotton, of which 466,3641anded from Brazil, 200,170 from
the United States, 136,953 from Egypt, and 407,695 from various other
sources. And because the cotton lobby kept Brazilian fibers out of
the American market, the Brazilian government was quite happy to see
sales to Germany increase. Brazil sold Germany 41% (91,789,700 kilos)
of the 197,419,700 kilos of coffee that it imported, and Berlin was
promising to reduce Colombia's and Venezuela's quotas. In cacao, Germany
was Brazil's third-ranked market after the United States and the United
Kingdom; it took 10,599 tons of the total 127,887 tons shipped abroad,
thereby exciting exporters about this new market. Also in 1938, 14%
of Germany's tobacco carne from Brazil.
And rubber and wool producers were particularly interested in that
market. Although wild rubber production was declining, of the 8,819
ton yield, fully 6,715 tons, or 77%, went to the Reich. These figures
had enormous importance for the weak Amazonian economy. Similarly,
wool producers had been pleased to sell Germany 88% of their 1936
shipments and 97% of their 1937 ones. When the percentage dipped to
40 in 1938, they were naturally alarmed.
The Vargas government necessarily had to pay more attention to its
citizens' interests than to the complaints of the United States about
unfair trading practices.
It gave in to German desires to continue the Aski trade.
Fortunately, the trade pattern during 1938 had allowed the Brazilians
to reduce their surplus of Aski marks to about 5,000,000.
Trade between the two countries continued to be based on the system
until the war brought it to an end.7Washington
provided credits to finance exports to Brazil, without increasing
Brazilian exports to the United States.
American quotas for coffee and cacao, and exclusion of cotton, did
not permit expansion, while Germany's system encouraged continuous
expansion of Brazilian exports.
The Brazilians interpreted American policies as intended to hold
back the Brazilian economy.
The United States sold more than it bought, demanded dealing in hard
currencies, and extended loans and credits that could be used only
for purchases in the American market. While it was not helping Brazil
earn hard currencies, the Roosevelt administration protested that
Brazil was not paying on its hard-currency bond issues and debts.
The policy conflict was heightened by Washington's objections to Brazil's
arms purchases in Germany, made with mixed hard-currency and Aski
marks.
American refusal to sell arms because of congressional prohibitions
against exporting them was difficult for the Brazilian military, then
intent on modernization, to understand. In the mid-1930s, Brazilian
intelligence estimates pointed to the United States as a possible
security threat, so American objections to purchases in Germany and
refusal to sell aroused suspicion as well as irritation.
[Moreover, the military was fearful of Argentine intentions and
nervous that, after Paraguay's mobilization for the Chaco War (1932-35)
with Bolivia, it could use its 77,000 man army to seek a more favorable
definition of its boundary with Mato Grosso.]
In addition, officers worried about Nazi organizations among German
immigrants in the southern states.
As a result, top military leaders were intimately involved in shaping
trade policy. The military also supported the idea of securing foreign
assistance to develop a steel industry as the basis for future industrialization
and independent arms production.The
United States did not apply strong economic pressures on Brazil to
end the Aski trade.
It was personally embarrassing for Secretary of State Cordell Hull
to have the largest country in the Good Neighborhood undermining the
reciprocal trade treaty system around which he had molded Washington's
foreign policy.
The State Department contented itself with hearing Brazilian leaders'
constant protestations of loyalty to pan-American ideals and refrained
from the strong actions necessary to bring the Brazilians to heel.
The Americans accepted rhetoric over action because they wished to
preserve the fa~ade of a successful Good Neighbor policy, even though
Brazil's participation in the Aski system was effectively a rejection
of the principles of that policy.As
early as November 1938, the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, Mario
de Pimentel Brandáo, advised Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha
that "we have to decide: the United States or Germany."8
But Vargas saw Washington's worries about Germany and its desire to
maintain a facade of pan-American unity, and Germany's need for raw
materials and markets, as windfall sources of new leverage that he
used to expand trade, obtain arms and assistance in building the Volta
Redonda steel complex, all the while maintaining an internal political
balance among the social, economic, and military groups supporting
his Estado Novo.
His government's policy was to avoid placing all of its eggs in one
basket until it absolutely had to, so that, in the words of American
Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, it could "squeeze the maximum out
of the United States on the one hand and the Fascist powers on the
other."9Brazilian trade
with Germany flourished until the outbreak of hostilities, and thereafter
was shut off by the British naval blockade.
As German armies triumphed in Europe, Berlin offered to increase its
purchases in Brazil after the war from a pre-war annual average of
170 million Reichmarks to 300 million Reichmarks.
It promised arms, railroad equipment, and a steel mill.10
Everything depended on the outcome of the war and on Germany's postwar
intentions.
As conquest added new millions to Germany's economic sphere, its
importance as a post-war trading partner increased.
But what if victory also brought Germany a colonial empire in tropical
Africa that might one day supply the cacao, coffee, tea, tobacco,
cotton, rubber, woods, etc., that it now obtained in Brazil?
German analysts predicted that, eventually, trade with Brazil would
"undergo certain changes and a contraction."
The Nazi government intended to invite German immigrants living
in Brazil to move to the new colonies.11From
his post in Berlin, Brazilian Ambassador Cyro de Freitas Valle warned
that the Reich's plans called for global spheres of influence based
on "Europe for Berlin, the Americas for Washington and Oriental
Asia for Tokyo." Russia would be the country-balance to the United
States.12 He thought that it would be better for the Germans to concentrate
on winning the war rather than spinning such schemes, but it surely
raised the question of where Brazil fitted into such a post-war world
order. If a victorious Third Reich planned to leave Brazil in the
American sphere of influence, would not the South American republic's
leaders be wise to solidify ties with the United States?The
Brazilians intelligently carried on simultaneous negotiations with
Berlin and Washington, seeking the best support for their plans to
construct an industrial infrastructure.
1 have told the story of these negotiations elsewhere,13 suffice to
say here that in September 1940, the Roosevelt administration carne
up with a funding package that did the trick.
Washington, not Berlin, provided the wherewithal to build the Volta
Redonda steel mill, which was both symbol and substance of Brazil's
industrial coming of age.14Brazil's
Course to Military Involvement ( MHIP : becoming an actively fighting
Ally )American willingness
to commit financial, technical, and physical backing for Brazil's
industrialization derived from more than concern over German trade
proposals. Throughout 1940, Washington had grown steadily more alarmed
at the European situation. With the fall of France, it took seriously
the possibility that if Britain collapsed, Germany might launch an
attack on the Western Hemisphere. Berlin did not have such plans,
but in mid-1940 anything seemed conceivable, and it was perhaps best
to imagine the worst. In late May, reports of a pro-Nazi coup plot
in Argentina and a British report of a possible German move against
Brazil galvanized Washington. Roosevelt ordered the army to plan operation
Pot of Gold, that would rush a 100,000 man force to secure points
from Belém to Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian military was decidedly
cool to the idea of letting American troops into the country, and
Pot of Gold did not go beyond the planning stage, but continuing conversations
over the next two years led to permitting American naval and air bases.Interestingly
enough, though the steel mill agreement was crucial to close Brazilian-American
ties, four days before the agreement was signed in Washington, on
September 26, 1940, the Vargas government decided that, in case of
German aggression, it would place all of Brazil's resources on the
American side. And because it could not supply arms immediately, Washington
showed its good will, and concern for its budding ally, by convincing
the British to allow German arms destined for Brazil to pass through
their naval blockade.15The
steel mill agreement linked Brazil irrevocably to the United States
and firmed its attitudes toward Germany. The Brazilian government
ended talks with Germany about post-war trade, tightened controls
on German- subsidized newspapers, and allowed Pan-American Airways
to fly overland from Belém to Rio de Janeiro, thereby shortening
the trip from Miami from five to two days. As the two countries literally
moved closer together, the United States now took up the Rio government's
1939 offer of bases in the northeast, including on Fernando de Noronha
island.Tied to the question
of bases was that of civilian airlines. From late 1938 onward, the
American government worried about the possibility of Axis military
bases being set up in the Western Hemisphere. Today we are more familiar
with the limitations of air transport and with the difficulties of
maintaining distant bases, but in the 1930s the sudden spurt of developments
in aviation made the idea of Axis bases seem possible. After all,
were not a number of the private airlines in Latin America, including
Brazil, the creation of German pilots and capital? Three government-controlled
airlines linked Brazil to Europe: Lufthansa, the Italian Lati, and
Air France. The latter built the first landing strips at Natal and
Salvador. Pan-American Airways connected Brazil to the United States
via a coastal seaplane route. Lufthansa fully owned the oldest Brazilian
airline, Condor, and held influential interest in Varig and Vasp.
Pan-Am's subsidiary, Panair do Brasil, flew a number of internal routes
and acted as a feeder for the parent's international flights. The
outbreak of hostilities forced Lufthansa to end its operations, and
the fall of France in 1940 eliminated Air France. Lati filled the
transoceanic gap, while inside Brazil, Condor expanded its flights
using German pilots and receiving equipment from blockade runners.
Washington wanted German influence eliminated from Varig, Vasp, and
Condor, and offered inducements of aircraft, financial credits, and
technical assistance. In the second half of 1941, Varig and Vasp fired
its German personnel. But Condor was more of a problem. The Vargas
government and its military aviation officials regarded Condor as
a pioneer that had opened valuable routes through the vast interior,
and were unwilling to agree to American demands that it be grounded
because of its German ties. Only after Brazil entered the war in August
1942 did the government act to liquidate Condor's financial links
to Lufthansa. Reorganized as Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do Sul, the
United States removed it from the black list.16As
for a grand-scale aerial attack or invasion, the hemisphere's one
accessible point seemed to be the northeastern tip of Brazil, which
was closer to French West Africa than to the nearest of the Antilles.
The region was undefended, beyond the range of American aircraft in
the Caribbean, and inaccessible by land to the Brazilian forces concentrated
in the south. In November 1940, to secure the Brazilian bulge, the
United States Army negotiated a secret agreement with Pan-American
Airways to build two chains of airfields from North America to the
northeast. In January 1941, Vargas gave verbal authority for Panair
do Brasil to undertake Airport Development Program (ADP) construction
at points such as Belém, Fortaleza, Natal, Recife, Maceió,
and Salvador. However, because important military figures as yet were
unwilling to throw themselves into the arms of the Americans, he delayed
issuing a formal decree until July 1941. During that six-month period,
General Erwin Rommel's tanks were sweeping across North Africa, and
Natal became key to the supply of the beleaguered British forces.
In mid-1941, Pan-Am set up a dummy corporation, Atlantic Airways Ltd.,
to ferry aircraft to the British. Because both the United States and
Brazil were still neutral, American air corps pilots could not fly
outside the country, and Brazil could not allow belligerent crews
to man the planes through its airspace. As it was, the first flight
of ten aircraft involved some embarrassment for Brazilian neutrality
because their registry was changed to British before they reached
Brazil, and the planes carried American pilots and British navigators
familiarizing themselves with the route. If the Brazilians had not
cooperated, it is very possible that the United States would have
occupied the area forcibly, as the drawing up of the earlier Pot of
Gold plan would suggest. Not surprisingly, Brazilian leaders were
reluctant to allow large numbers of American troops to garrison the
airfields. Eventually, such problems were amicably resolved, and the
huge Parnamirim field at Natal became the focal point in the Allied
air transport system that ran west then north through Belém
and the Guianas, across the Caribbean to Miami, and east over the
Atlantic via Ascension Island and across Africa to the China-Burma-India
theater. As traffic intensified, so, too, did Brazilian willingness
to give the Americans more control over the bases.Without
Natal serving as the "trampoline to victory", the Allied
supply problems of 1942 and 1943 might have been insurmountable. If
Vargas and the Brazilian military had not cooperated, the United States
might have used force, which would have likely caused serious and
prolonged fighting in Brazil, and would have certainly shattered pan-American
unity. So this cooperation was an important element in the successful
prosecution of the war. Considering Brazil's contribution to the war
effort, it is well to recall that six months before Pearl Harbor and
fourteen months before Brazil was in the war, the ADP fields were
part of the Allied supply system and the anti- submarine campaign.17Parallel
with the airbase development, the U.S. Navy's South Atlantic Force
(in March 1943 raised to the Fourth Fleet), under Vice-Admiral Jonas
H. Ingram, began operating in Brazilian waters in late 1941, after
Pearl Harbor. The Germans responded to the above activities, and to
Brazil's break in diplomatic relations at the Rio Conference in January
1942, with submarine attacks on Brazilian merchant ships. In February
and March, four vessels went down off the coast of the United States.
Nearly the entire Brazilian commercial fleet was circulating between
Brazil and the northern republic. Vargas demanded that the United
States provide naval convoys and arms for his merchantmen, or he would
embargo them. He took that drastic step in April 1942, but, aater
that month, he met with Admiral Ingram to discuss protection for Brazilian
vessels. He so liked and trusted Ingram that calling him his "Sea
Lord," he made him his secret naval advisor and opened all ports,
repair facilities, and airfie1ds to the American navy, and ordered
Brazilian air and naval forces to operate according to Ingram's recommendations.
The American admiral was thereafter responsible for Brazil's seaward
defenses.This arrangement
was in the old tradition of American naval commanders, who in the
last century had often worked out their own basing and operations.
It was negotiated without the prior knowledge of other officials on
either side. With the army generals giving top priority to defense
in the south along the Argentine border, Vargas acted to forestall
Axis naval attacks. This secret pact between the two men did more
to protect Brazil and to solidify military cooperation than any other
action of the two governments. Vargas's "Sea Lord" sent
the president reports and used his direct line to him to request his
intervention in various situations. Thereby, the U.S. Navy had a level
of access to the Brazilian president that the U.S. Army did not have.In
May 1942 the German navy stepped up its submarine campaign and four
more Brazilian vessels went to the bottom. On June 16, Hitler ordered
a submarine blitz against Brazil, believing that its cooperation with
the United States indicated that it was not neutral but in a state
of war. Ten submarines left French ports for the South Atlantic. The
ensuing campaign saw the tally of sunken Brazilian vessels increase.
As the ships went down, public demonstrations in favor of the Allies
became frequent.Meanwhile,
resistance against going farther with the United States also stepped
up. Unfortunately, on May 1 Vargas was seriously injured in an automobile
accident, suffering a broken jaw and a dislocated hip. Pro-Axis agitators
whispered that he was no longer capable of governing. In May, a military-political
agreement with the United States established a still secret alliance
between them, but, with Vargas in bed, little was done to fulfill
its commitments. After losing two of its ships to German torpedoes,
Mexico declared war, increasing the pressure on Brazil, which at that
point had lost eight ships. In late June, German forces poured into
the Soviet Union, emboldening the pro-Axis elements to claim that
the Reich's military was invincible. A plot to depose Vargas developed
among high-ranking officers, who warned him not to identify himself
any closer with the Americans. This was counteracted with changes
in the command of the Rio police and by American response to Brazilian
losses.The United States,
by this time, was counting on the Lend-Lease program to keep the Brazilians
happy with shipments of arms and equipment, but because of the German
submarines, it was having difficulty delivering the goods. Ultimately,
Lend-Lease would help turn Brazil into the principal military power
of South America; it was a problem of getting started. The these-way
relationship among Brazil, Argentina, and the United States was also
of concern. The Brazilians wanted a total commitment from Washington
to stand with them if Argentina attacked; the Americans were willing
to support Brazil only if such aggression was "sympathetic to,
or instigated by, the Axis powers."18 The Roosevelt administration
wanted to tighten its friendship with Brazil without completely alienating
Argentina. In 1943, their positions would be reversed. The Americans
frequently had difficulty understanding Brazilian fears of a possible
Argentine attack. They seemed unaware that American intelligence reports
had been saying for a couple of decades that this was a basic Brazilian
security worry. Perhaps these reports did not get read by the correct
people?By mid-August, the
ten German U-boats went into action against coastal shipping, attacking
in quick succession six vessels off Segipe and Bahia. In five days
the Germns cut maritime communications with the northeast, and succeeded
in doing what diplomacy had been able to do only superficially, namely,
uniting Brazil against them. One ship, the Baependi, went down with
two-hundred and fifty soldiers and seven officers, along with two
artillery batteries and other equipment. The army cried for revenge.
Another vessel sank with pilgrims en route to a Eucharistic Congress
in Sáo Paulo. The patient Brazilians erupted in a wave of revulsion,
as city after city saw anti- Axis demonstrations and violence. Roosevelt
sent submarine chasers for the Brazilian navy and instructed the embassy
to buy unexportable surpluses of coffee, cacao, and Brazil nuts. In
the streets, Brazilians burned Axis flags and chanted "We want
war!". On August 22, the presidents cabinet approved a declaration
saying that a state of war existed with the Axis.The
decision for war rallied domestic opponents around the Vargas regime,
put pressure on the neighboring countries to reconsider their own
positions, and further weakened ties to Europe and tightened them
with the United States. Prior to August 1942, Brazil had gone well
beyond benevolent neutrality in favor of the United States. As noted
above, before the Japanese attack had forced the Americans into the
conflict, Brazil had helped the United States Navy to replenish its
warships, had cooperated in the anti- submarine campaign, and had
allowed construction of military air bases and the flight of war planes
through its air space. It is incorrect to say that unwarranted German
aggression compelled Brazil to become a belligerent. Vargas's policies
were unfolding to their logical conclusion. Brazil had embarked on
the route to war when Vargas permitted the Airport Development Program
to start construction. Recall that he gave oral permission on January
19, 1941, nine days before approving the break in relations with the
Axis.19 However, weighing domestic doubts about, and resistance to,
joining the Allies, if the Germans had not attacked, it is possible
that Brazil would have delayed action and might well have experienced
political turbulence akin to that which afflicted Argentina. The attack
stimulated public support for mobilization, and for unreserved alignment
with the Allies to the point of sending troops to Europe.In
early September 1942, the degree of Brazilian commitment was indicated
when Vargas gave American Admiral Ingram full authority over Brazilian
navy and air forces, and complete responsibility for the defense of
the long Brazilian coastline. As naval historian Samuel E. Morison
declared, Brazil's entry into the war was "an event of great
importance in naval history." Without Brazilian participation,
it would have been impossible to shut the "Atlantic Narrows"
to Axis blockade-runners.20 The Brazilian confidence in the American
navy did not extend to the American army. Brazilian naval officers
had served on American warships in World War 1 and, since the early
1920s, the United States had a naval mission working with the Brazilian
navy. The Brazilian army had sent officers to train in Germany from
1906 to 1912, and had hosted a French military mission from 1919 to
1939. Only in the mid- 1930s had it begun to develop links with its
American counterpart in the limited areas of coastal artillery and
health services. Moreover, it had come apart in the Revolution of
1930 and was not a well-trained and equipped force in 1942. Indeed,
in the strategic region from Belém to Salvador it then had
only 18,600 troops, with a scant fifty-two guns larger than.30 caliber.
So it was slow to allow the American army to expand its ferrying activities
or establish headquarters on their soil. Much to its chagrin, the
American army was able to do both things only by navigating in Admiral
Ingram's diplomatic wake. By the end of the year, the United States
Army had located its South Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command
at Natal and the United States Armed Forces, South Atlantic, at Recife,
where Ingram's Fourth U.S. Fleet was also based.21Some
American officials, such as Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, could
not believe that Vargas was serious about giving Ingram operational
command of Brazil's coastal defense forces. Ingram had to threaten
to resign to convince the Secretary that it was not some sort of Brazilian
trick.22 The American and Brazilian leaders looked at military cooperation
differently. Once committed, the Brazilians wanted respect even while
recognizing that theirs was the weaker side of the relationship. The
Americans tended to think that no self respecting country would place
its forces under foreign command. Likely, Vargas would not Nave taken
such a step if he had understood American attitudes better. He knew
that Brazil was weak, but in the manner of a "patron," he
believed that the weak should seek the shadow of the strong, and that
the strong had a duty to protect the weak. Probably, too, he knew
that his army had not yet drawn up its war plans and that it was about
to enter a realm that its officers had only read about.23 Vargas understood
that the Americans would levy a price for their protection but, because
it was in the national interest of the United States to have Brazil
securely at its side, he believed that he could keep the accounts
relatively balanced. Even as he placed Brazil's defense in American
hands, he put pressure on Washington to keep the work on the Volta
Redonda steel mill moving forward.24 He did not let the war distract
him from the basic goal of industrializing the country.Brazilian
Wartime EconomyThe
war brought an almost immediate improvement in Brazil's international
trade status.
Even though cut off from most of continental Europe, its exports elsewhere
rose dramatically.
An increasingly favorable balance of trade gave Brazil large hard
currency reserves for the first time since the Great Depression.
Its 1942 exports were valued about $388,000,000, giving it a surplus
of $148,000,000, more than double the 1941 figure. At the end of 1942,
it held gold reserves of $121,000,000 compared to $40,000,000 in 1939.
Its textile factories especially were finding ready customers in Argentina
and South Africa.
Various sectors of the economy responded to the stimulus of domestic
demand caused by the sudden inability to import foreign manufactures.
The American publication Business Week proclaimed that "...
there is no question but that Brazil has the biggest potential of
any nation in Latin America." The war benefitted Brazil financially
and at the same time increased the political clout of industrial workers
and their unions.
Vargas used the onset of war to broaden popular support for the regime,
promising better protection for workers.
Almost inconspicuously, government authorities began using Estado
Nacional in place of Estado Novo.25When
Brazil joined the Allies, it was their economic dependant.
Of the $2,242,200,000 foreign investment, the British held 48%, the
Americans 25%, the Canadians 18%, and a mix of others 9%.
Foreigners controlled street car lines, electric power, coal and
oil importation, much of the flour milling, all of cement production,
many of the tugs and barges in Rio's harbor, and telegraphic communications
with the rest of the world. A British company had owned the sewers
of the older parts of Rio since 1857. Many of the movie theaters in
big cities were owned by Paramount, RKO, and Twentieth- Century Fox,
who actively discouraged development of the national cinema industry.
Newspapers received subsidies from foreign embassies, the news wire
services were foreign -Associated Press, United Press, Reuters, and
the German Trans-Oceanic- and all newsprint was imported. The air
force's aircraft carne from abroad, as did the army's heavy weapons,
equipment, and 50% of expendable ordnance. Moreover, because a high
proportion of inter- state commerce travelled by sea, rather than
overland, the economy was overly exposed to potential collapse due
to well-aimed torpedoes.26The
war highlighted Brazil's dependency on foreign investments, imports,
and markets, but it also offered a unique occasion to construct an
infrastructure that would allow nationally-controlled economic development.
With Europe occupied by Nazi legions and Britain weakened, Brazil
was more dependent on the United States. No longer able to juggle
European and American interests, it now bargained comprehensively
with Washington. Clearly, this potentially threatened national sovereignty,
but Brazil had the distinct advantage that the United States desperately
needed certain Brazilian products and the strategically important
air and naval bases. Brazil was then the sole source, for example,
of quartz crystals used in military communications equipment. The
American war factories also needed Brazilian iron ore, rubber, chrome,
manganese, nickel, bauxite, tungsten, industrial diamonds, and thorium-rich
monazite sands (this last used in atomic energy research). The Brazilians,
therefore, held some important cards and their president was a good
poker player. They negotiated guaranteed price agreements with the
United States that, for the first time, assured Brazil of a consistent
return on its exports. Moreover, Washington wanted to reduce Brazilian
dependency on American goods because its factories were straining
to supply the Allied forces and it required its over-burdened shipping
for other missions. It encouraged import substitution and the improving
of internal transportation. The war was an opportunity for Brazil
to move towards development, and, until 1944, the United States had
the motivation to assist.One
of the results of this scenario was the late 1942 American Technical
Mission, headed by Morris Llewellyn Cooke, a respected New Deal administrator,
and composed of a chemical engineer, an economist, an industrial relations
specialist, a geologist, a lawyer, and fuel, power, metallurgical,
transportation, and production technicians. These experts worked with
a highly talented and well-connected Brazilian team to draw up a comprehensive
set of recommendations that sought to satisfy both the immediate demands
of wartime and long-range growth with a carefully drawn development
program that employed electrical power, light metals, and the airplane
to substitute coal, steel, heavy industry, and railroads. The joint
report made proposals related to such diverse subjects as cargo planes
and gliders, land transportation, fuel, petroleum, electric energy,
textiles, paper, mining, metallurgy, the chemical industry, commercial
associations, food production, markets and prices, education, translation
of books into Portuguese, industrial financing and sources of credit,
manufacture of electrical equipment, economic mobilization, and regional
development planning. The Cooke Mission's work, combined with the
activities of the Rubber Reserve Company in Amazonia, the Basic Economy
Program to improve food supply, health and sanitation in the northeast,
and the wide- ranging projects of Nelson Rockefeller's Office of the
Coordinator of Inter- American Affairs created a revolution of rising
expectations that caused Brazilians to think that the oft-predicted
era of future greatness was about to dawn. An example of the startling
proposals that carne out of the wartime emergency was one to build
an elaborate system of canals, railroads, and highways through the
interior of South America, linking the Orinoco, Amazonian, and Rio
de La Plata river systems. Once the Allies had neutralized the submarine
threat in the Atlantic, the idea was filed in the archives. United
States officials stimulated the belief that industrialization, electrification,
increased trade, housing, and education would be among the immediate
consequences of Allied victory. Post-war relations would be soured
by the rapid decline of American interest in such expensive ventures
in peacetime.27 But even if all the dreams did not become real, the
wartime centralized planning set a powerful example that influenced
post-war economic development efforts.The
wartime economic boom was somewhat limited geographically to the south-central
region, with the greatest impacts being felt in the cities of Rio
de Janeiro and Sáo Paulo.
The urban working class expanded apace with the increase in factories.
In 1945, about 2,000,000 could be classified as urban workers (about
15%) out of the approximately 14,000,000 salaried employees in the
40,000,000 plus population.
Two decades earlier, manufacturing had been limited largely to textiles
and food and beverage processing. By 1945, some 70,000 small and medium-sized
factories employed more than 50% (1,100,000) of urban workers, who
were producing, in addition to textiles, food, and drink, metal goods,
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cement, tires, and assembled vehicles.
The growing government agencies employed a consider- able number of
white-collar workers. But the bulk of the working population, two-thirds
of it, was still found in rural areas, in agriculture, stock raising,
and collection of rubber, nuts, and herva mate.28 As industrialization
stepped up its pace after the war, it would cause a huge rural to
urban migration that would make Brazil, a half-century later, a highly
urbanized country.Brazil's
War AimsBy late 1942,
Brazil was securely in the American camp and its military officers
were talking about committing combat troops. Oddly, after having been
pursued since 1938, the Brazilians now found that the cadence and
direction of the dance had shifted, they now had to hurry after the
Americans, whose concern for Brazil declined as the Germans were driven
back across North Africa. At the start of 1942, Northeast Brazil had
stood on the front lines, but as 1943 opened, it was a rear area trampoline
that bounced personnel and supplies to where the action was. Brazil's
leaders saw that in order to benefit from the war, the country could
not content itself with providing raw materials, pass-through bases,
and diplomatic support; Brazil had to make the blood sacrifice. It
also had to clarify its objectives, so that it could better coordinate
the multiple agencies that were interacting with the Allies.The
architect of the alliance with the United States, Foreign Minister
Oswaldo Aranha, penned an analysis of Brazil's international situation
for President Vargas on the eve of his secret meeting with President
Roosevelt at Natal on January 28, 1943. This statement is one of the
most important documents in the history of Brazilian foreign relations.
Aranha advised his old friend that the traditional policy of "supporting
the United States in the world in exchange for its support in South
America" should be maintained "until the victory of American
arms in the war and until the victory and consolidation of American
ideals in the peace." The United States would lead the world
when peace was restored and it would be a grave error for Brazil not
to be at its side. Both nations were "cosmic and universal,"
with continental and global futures. Aranha knew that Brazil was yet
"a weak country economically and militarily," but its natural
growth, or post-war migration, would give it the capital and population
that would make it "inevitably one of the great economic and
political powers of the world." He advised against frightening
badly needed American and British capital with overly nationalistic
economic policies. Brazilians should, he wrote, accept the difficult
war economy without restraint, so that by "ceding in war,"
they would "gain in peacetime" reciprocal arrangements of
mutual benefit. Postwar economic policies should seek the liberalization
of international trade, the deepening of American collaboration with
the "Vargas program" of industrialization, and the free
movement of capital and immigrants to Brazil. He urged intimate contact
between the two countries and continuous exchanges of views at the
ministerial level. They should prepare the military for combat, because
"this preparation by itself, without our being called to battle,
will be counted as one or more victories at the peace table."Brazil
should adhere to the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration,
and it should join the United Nations study committees, and seek a
place in the Allied supreme military councils. Brazil should also
be attentive to the future of European colonies and mandates, especially
Portuguese ones and the Guianas. If the Portuguese empire collapsed,
Brazil should demand Washington's backing for the "defense of
a patrimony that is hereditarily Brazilian." All European colonies
in the Western Hemisphere should either be given independence or absorbed
by neighboring states. Brazil must play a key role in this process.
It should particularly express its interest in French Guiana, because
of its importance for the security of the Amazon region. And given
Africa's relevance for Brazilian security, Brazil should demand a
voice in the future of the continent.He
ended with eleven policy objectives that Brazil should pursue:
1. a better position in world politics;
2. consolidation of its superiority in South America;
3. a more secure and intimate cooperation with the United States;
4. greater influence over Portugal and its possessions;
5. development of maritime power;
6. development of air power;
7. development of heavy industries;
8. creation of war industries;
9. creation of industries -agricultural, extractive, and light mineral-
complementary to those of the United States and essential for world
reconstruction;
10. expansion of Brazil's railways and highways for economic and strategic
purposes;
11. exploration for essential combustible fuels.
This list reads like a summary of Brazilian foreign and domestic policy
of the next two decades. Aranha was aware that close collaboration
with the United States could be dangerous, but, as he commented to
Minister of War General Eurico Dutra, Brazil was at the mercy of more
powerful nations and, unless it had a mighty ally, "the future
of Brazil will be everyone's, except the Brazilians."29The
Brazilian Expeditionary ForceAt
the Natal meeting, Roosevelt encouraged the idea of Brazil committing
troops, telling Vargas that he wanted him with him at the peace table.
If Brazil sent its soldiers to fight, it could legitimately claim
a larger role in postwar restructuring of the world. After the first
war, in which it was an ally but without a combat role, it played
a minor part at the conference, and although active in the League
of Nations, it had resigned in frustration at not obtaining a permanent
council seat in 1926. In addition to international reasons, Vargas
likely thought that distracting the military with a foreign campaign
would give him some political space in which to develop a populist
base with which to preserve the gains of the freshly labeled Estado
Nacional. The dictatorship's opponents quickly regarded a combat role
as guarantee that the regime would not outlast the war. They asserted
that Brazilians could not fight against tyranny overseas and return
to live under it at home.Foreign
Minister Oswaldo Aranha saw the war and an expeditionary force as
a way to expand Brazil's historic cooperation with the United States
into "a true alliance of destinies." That policy of cooperation
had been, Aranha noted, "a source of security" for Brazil,
that by giving the United States assurance of Brazil's support in
international questions, Brazil could "count on them in [South]
American ones." The FEB would, in his view, convince the Americans
that Brazil was committed to an alliance "materially, morally,
and militarily." The alliance was his strategy for gaining United
States assistance in Brazilian industrialization, which he saw as
"the first defense against external and internal danger."
He argued that the FEB was the start of a wider collaboration, involving
Brazil's total military reorganization. More- over, he did not believe
that they could restrict themselves solely to an expeditionary force
if they wanted to insure American involvement in other Brazilian military
matters, such as development of the navy and air force, and defense
of Southern Brazil. Looking ahead, he believed that Brazil would have
to keep its forces mobilized for some time after the peace to help
maintain the post-war order. In a cabinet meeting, he asserted that
they should work to convince the Americans that "having chosen
the road to follow and our companions for the journey we will not
after our course or hesitate in our steps."30For
some Brazilian officers, especially the Escola Militar graduates of
the Class of 1917, committing troops would vindicate their not having
fought in World War 1; it would also revenge the deaths of friends
and colleagues killed in Axis submarine attacks, and, perhaps more
importantly, it would increase the army and air force's effective
strength and ability to deal with various contingencies. Among the
latter were the strong United States military and naval bases in Northeast
Brazil, which the Brazilians wanted to insure that the Americans would
vacate after the war; the German immigrant populations in Southern
Brazil, which they wanted to be able to control; and, the ever-present
fear of Argentina, which was then under a military regime. But the
army was not about to ship overseas and trust that all would be well
at home or on the frontiers. Its leaders were particularly concerned
about Argentina. In July 1943, Minister of War Dutra declared that
whatever number of troops went abroad, he wanted an equivalent force
left in Brazil "to guarantee sovereignty and the maintenance
of order and tranquility here." Clearly, the home front had to
be secure, but to achieve that objective Brazilian leaders would have
to pry sufficient weapons from the Americans, who then were struggling
to arm their own troops and to produce arms for the Allies. The Brazilian
government decided that it would have to send troops to the battlefields.Washington
favored the idea because if the largest Latin American country fought
with the Allies, it would enhance the image of the United States as
leader of the hemisphere. The Roosevelt administration also hoped
that it would make Brazil a pro-American bulwark in South America.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull saw Brazil as a counterweight to Argentina.
Both the Brazilians and the Americans adroitly played on the other's
worries about Argentina to bolster their policy goals. But, of course,
the closer Brazil and the United States became, the more nervous the
Argentines grew.31Some American
army leaders were reluctant to accept the Brazilian offer of troops.
Their willingness to accommodate the Brazilians was in direct proportion
to what they wanted from them. By the end of 1942, the army had its
Brazilian air bases and related supply lines through them to North
Africa, so why worry about the Brazilians? A debate took place in
American military and diplomatic circles over the merits of accepting
or deflecting Brazilian desires. Earlier in 1942, the two governments
considered a Brazilian occupation of French and Dutch Guiana and,
at Natal (Jan. 1943), Roosevelt suggested to Vargas that Brazil replace
Portugal's troops in the Azores and Madeira, so that the Portuguese
could reinforce their home defenses. Nothing came of these talks,
but after the Natal Conference, it was not if Brazil would fight,
but where? In mid-April 1943, the Brazilian military representative
in Washington, General Esteváo Leitáo de Carvalho, told
Chief of Staff George Marshall that Brazil wanted to form a three
or four division expeditionary Corps, and, in May, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff approved the idea.32It
is important to emphasize that the expeditionary force was a Brazilian
idea, that it resulted from a calculated policy of the Vargas government
and not from an American policy to draw Brazil directly into the fighting.Organization
and Commitment of the Expeditionary ForceThere
was some difference of opinion between the Brazilians and Americans
over which troops should be used to form the expeditionary force.
The American military, and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense
Commission, which had been set up to coordinate military relations,
thought it logical to use the units in the Northeast, but the Brazilians
looked at the 15,000 American personnel at bases in that region and
thought differently. Minister Dutra wanted to build three regional
training camps to prepare three divisions simultaneously, thereby
creating valuable facilities for the postwar era. But the United States
could not provide the weapons and equipment necessary to outfit three
camps, that is to say, 50% of the equipment for three divisions. Moreover,
because neither Brazil nor the United States had enough ships to carry
even one full division all at once, the Pentagon carne up with the
idea of providing 50% of a division's equipment for training, which
would be left behind for the training of each successive division.
They would all be armed and equipped in the Theater of Operations.Just
before he visited the United States in August 1943, Minister of War
Dutra, who wanted to command the planned corps, sounded out various
generals as to their interest in leading one of the divisions. General
Joáo Baptista Mascarenhas de Moraes, who had commanded the
northeastern military region (the 7th) from June 1940 to January 1943,
responded immediately, while the others hesitated. Eventually two
other division commanders were designated and preparations begun,
but the plans were not carried out, and the force was fixed at one
division.33The Brazilian
army of 1943 did not have standing divisions ready for intensified
training and transportation, but rather was organized in static geographic
regional commands which presided over dispersed regimentalized units.
These, in turn, were quartered in barracks that often had scant room
to receive additional mobilized troops, and little space for training
of the sort the American army was then receiving. Moreover, most of
the barracks were in urban areas. And because the troops were mainly
drafted from the locality, to form a division from one region would
place a politically unacceptable sacrifice on that region. So the
unwillingness to use northeastern units was related to more than worry
about the American presence.To
form the expeditionary division, units were called in from across
the map of Brazil. On the negative side, this meant that these units
were not accustomed to working together. On the positive side, planners
argued that since the army had been trained and organized on a French
model since 1919, it would be easier to shift to an American model
if the division was composed of units which had no previous joint
experience. Adaptation would be faster.Oddly,
instead of using the coming combat experience to enhance the professionalization
of a maximum number of regular junior officers, the army called up
a considerable number of reserve officers, many of whom were professional
men in civilian life. Of the 870 infantry line officers in the force,
at least 302 were reservists. Fortunately for historians, a group
of them produced one of the most useful books on the expeditionary
force.34 It is not clear whether this was a political decision or
a purely administrative one. But it does seem that there were not
enough junior officers to staff the expeditionary force. Later, in
Italy, referring to the shortage of military school graduates and
to the professional deficiencies of the reserve officers, Mascarenhas
requested, as late as April 1945, to commission sixty infantry sergeants
to serve as platoon leaders.35There
was also considerable difficulty filling the ranks of the designated
units. Lacking military police units, the army took in policemen from
Sáo Paulo's Forja Publica, it created signal units with men
from electric and telephone companies, and it organized a nursing
detachment by public recruitment of interested women.36 The fact that
draftees were being sent overseas persuaded many to escape service,
but, since the draft was imposed in 1916, the army always had large
numbers who evaded duty. For example, in the 7th Military Region in
Northeast Brazil, while Mascarenhas was commander, the 1941 call-up
of 7898 men had an evasion rate of 48.9%, and of those who did present
themselves, fully 41 % were medically unfit. Indeed, this was an improvement,
the previous year the evasion rate had been 68%! Among the 3434 volunteers
in that region, 2201 or 64% were found fit for service. These figures
were fairly typical of the national experience. The rejection rate
for medical and health reasons was high for both draftees and active
duty troops. In forming one of the later echelons, 18,000 soldiers
in regular units were examined to obtain 6,000 men. In the case of
the fourth echelon, the 10,000 active-duty soldiers examined netted
only 4,500 physically fit for embarkation. I have discussed elsewhere
in more detail the recruitment and medical examinations, suffice to
say here that it was the nation's poor health that stalled the mobilization.
In January 1945, General Ralph Wooten observed that the Brazilian
army was "near the bottom of the barree' in finding combat personnel
and that it was "a mistake to expect any additional assistance
from Brazil in this respect."37The
training functioned on multiple levels. Brazilian officers had been
sent to the United States for courses since 1938, mostly in coast
artillery and aviation. Indeed, in early 1941, well before Pearl Harbor,
Brazil was sending groups of officers for training in a variety of
specialties. The pace continued to accelerate to the point where,
by the end of 1944, somewhat over 1000 Brazilian military personnel
had gone to the United States. The American army created a special
Brazilian course at its Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, that enrolled 259 officers, the largest contingent of any
one foreign nation to pass through its classrooms. The school commandant
said that the Brazilians, who had already completed their own three-year
general staff course, "knew more than most of his instructora."38The
troops sent to Italy in five echelons eventually totaled 25,334. In
July 1944, the first echelon arrived in Naples. After some delays
with equipment and training, on September 15, the 6th Infantry Regiment
and support troops, under Brigadier General Euclydes Zenobio da Costa,
went into the line of the Fourth Corps of the U.S. Fifth Army. Army
commander, Mark Clark, decided on this partial commitment because
he needed to beef up the Fourth Corps, that had dwindled to barely
the level of a reinforced division because of units being detached
for the Seventh Army's invasion of southern France in July. The Fifth
Army had lost fully seven divisions to the French operation, so the
Brazilians' arrival at that moment was opportune. The American Fifth
and British Eighth Armies were readying a drive on the German's Gothic
Line, in an attempt to reach the Po Valley and Bologna before Christmas.
The Fifth Army's three corps (from west to east: U.S. Fourth, U.S.
Second, and British Twelfth) were to attack with the Second Corps
as spearhead and the Fourth immobilizing and harassing the Germans
before it. Clark thought that this would give the Brazilians a relatively
smooth introduction to combat.It
is interesting to note the different reactions of the Brazilians and
the Americans to the subsequent action. The Brazilians moved along
nicely pursuing retreating German units from September 16 to October
30, when they suffered a sudden counterattack that they held back
for about ten hours, until they ran short of ammunition and were forced
to fall back. From the American records, we can see that this was
perceived as a normal combat occurrence, but the accounts published
by Brazilian officers are full of finger- pointing and acrimony. On
the scene, Mascarenhas blamed and reprimanded the troops for their
lack of caution and fleeing before a Memoralized enemy." Of course,
he was anxious that they do well, and he was still a bit inexperienced
himself in the nature of this war. They had done about as well as
anyone could have under the circumstances. The U.S. 92d Division which
replaced them, when they moved over to the Reno Valley, was likewise
unable to drive the Germans from the ridge line that they held for
the next five months.39Performance
of the Expeditionary Force The expeditionary force's (FEB from here
on) role was a tactical one; the bulk of its combat experience was
at the platoon level. The division's combat diary is largely a summary
of patrol actions, as was the case for the Fifth Army generally in
the autumn and winter of 1944-45. The Brazilians recognized this;
they did not claim that their role or its impact was strategic, although,
with age, a few veterans have made that assertion. In his memoirs,
the division's chief of staff, Floriano de Lima Brayner, observed
that at "no time did the FEB engage in strategic level operations."40
And after the war, to symbolize the level of the role they had played,
the army erected a monument to the FEB lieutenants at the Academia
Militar das Agulhas Negras. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how
one division could have played anything but a tactical role in the
campaign in northern Italy.This
point has been lost sight of by some observers, such as journalist
William Waack, whose As duas faces da glória: A FEB vista pelos
seus aliados e inimigos 41 seems based on the premise that the Brazilians
claimed a greater importance for the FEB than they actually did. He
contrasts some German veterans' lack of knowledge and remembrance
of the Brazilian force and the sharp criticism of American liaison
and inspection reports with the "grandiloquence" of Brazilian
narratives on the FEB.The
principal German division facing the Brazilians had a large number
of very young and rather old soldiers, and was commanded by officers
who had served long years and had survived the rigors of the Russian
front. Some of these men may have been worn out, but most were veterans
who had immeasurably more combat experience than the Brazilians. Indeed,
the FEB sailed from Brazil with most of its troops untrained. The
officers were startled by the intense training program that the Americans
insisted upon.The literature
on the FEB makes much of its struggle to take an elevation called
"Monte Castello" during the winter of 1944-45. In combat,
everything is a matter of perspective and scale. The front for an
army commander is measured in miles, for a corps commander it is narrowed
to a mountain ridge, for a division commander the focus is a hill,
for a company commander the objective is part of the slope, for platoon
leaders it is a matter of certain pillboxes and gun positions, and
for the soldier it is the few feet and inches ahead of him. Each one
experiences a different battle. The Italian campaign was brutal because
the Allies had to fight continuously uphill to dislodge the Germans
from commanding elevations. When the FEB reached division strength
in November, it took its place with the U.S. Fourth Corps in the mountains
north of Florence and west of Bologna. The Fifth Army's objective
was to break through the German's so-called Gothic Line and descend
into the Po Valley to take Bologna. The Fourth Corps confronted an
imposing mountain ridge known as Mt. Belvedere - Mt. Torraccia, from
which German artillery and mortars could harass traffic on the west
to east highway #64, that cuts its narrow way through the mountains
from Pistoia to Bologna. It is difficult to imagine driving defenders
from such a place. Just beyond the spa-town of Porretta Terme, the
mountains open into a huge basin flanked by low elevations on its
right and left, and blocked by the suddenly rising Belvedere-Torraccia
to the front. On its left, the ridge is a sheer rock wall that appears
smooth from a distance, to the right the ridge becomes jagged and
broken, with a road winding upward around it off in the direction
of Montese, a key point before descent into the Po Valley. The American
92d "Black Buffalo" Division and then the l0th Mountain
Division faced Belvedere. The FEB confronted a hill that juts out
below the top of Torraccia. From that hill, the Germns could rake
the lower slopes to the west (left) from well-prepared positions.
That hill, which German maps labeled simply "101/19", was
what local people called Monte Castello. Walking up it today is hardly
even tiring, but going up it under artillery, machine-gun, mortar,
and rifle fire would be suicidal. Monte Castello held the Brazilians
at bay in four assaults - November 24, 25, 29, December 12- before
falling to them on February 21. They spent four out of their nine
months of combat under its guns. The German defenders admired their
stubbornness. After the failed December 12th assault in which the
Brazilians suffered 145 casualties, compared with a German loss of
5 killed and 13 wounded, a German captain told a captured FEB lieutenant:
"Frankly, you Brazilians are either crazy or very brave. I never
saw anyone advance against machine-guns and well-defended positions
with such disregard for life ... You are devils."42 Though the
elevation itself pales beside its neighbors, it became symbolic of
the FEB's combat ability and, in a bigger sense, of Brazil's coming
of age as a country to be taken seriously. The Rio newspaper, A Manhd,
editorialized that "The young Brazilians who implanted the Brazilian
banner on its summit will conquer for Brazil the place that it merits
in the world of tomorrow."43Monte
Castello was and is a minor elevation lost amidst some of the ruggest
terrain in Italy. It does not show up on large-scale maps of Italy
and one has to search out local hiking maps to find it. It was not
labeled clearly on American battle maps, and likely the German defenders
did not even know its name. In fact, in the FEB war diary, the first
mention of that name was the day of its capture, February 21. It would
be surprising if anyone besides the Brazilians remembered the name.
Naturally they gave more importance to the names of the terrain that
they captured than did either the defending Germans or the Americans
concerned with the broader front. The American liaison detachment
diarist commented that "this feature had been the objective of
two previous Brazilian attacks, in which they suffered considerable
casualties, its capture was a distinct loss to the enemy, since it
deprived him of his last good observation" point in the area.44After
the war, the Brazilian veterans and the Brazilian army made much of
Monte Castello. For them the battle had great symbolic importance.
Their part in the capture of Belvedere-Castello convinced the Brazilians
that they were up to the task that they had taken on. The fact is
that the FEB and the U.S. l0th Mountain Division were effective in
the joint operation which drove the Germans off important elevations
that allowed the Allied spring offensive to move forward. lf either
of the two divisions had failed, that offensive would have been delayed.45Relations
between the Brazilian troops and the Americans were sometimes tense.
It was awkward for the Brazilians to be totally dependent on the American
forces for training, clothing, arms, equipment, and food. The American
stress on training, training, and more training, even of frontline
personnel, bemused the Brazilians. lt was a clash between two cultures,
one that so believed in education that its army's terminology was
drawn from the language of the school house,46 and the other that
left most of its people unschooled. The outcome was a successful example
of coalition warfare, which always requires determined effort and
understanding to blend national styles into a winning combination.
But the FEB went beyond the standard idea of coalition warfare because
of its total integration into the American army. It was not a colonial
unit, as were the British Indian ones, or a Commonwealth military,
such as the Canadian, New Zealander, or South African, nor a Free
"this or that," such as the Polish or French contingents.
It was a division from an army of an independent, sovereign state
that voluntarily placed its men and women under United States command.
The connection could not Nave been tighter and still have preserved
the FEB's integrity of command and its Brazilian identity. It never
lost either.The FEB completed
all the missions confided to it and compared favorably with the American
divisions of the Fourth Corps. Unfortunately, the heavy symbolism
of Monte Castello has obscured the FEB's victory at Montese on April
16, in which it took the town after a four-day grueling battle, suffering
426 casualties.47 In the next days it fought to a standstill the German
148th Division and Fascist Italian Monte Rosa, San Marco, and Italia
Divisions, which surrendered to General Mascarenhas on April 29-30.
In a matter of days the Brazilians trapped and took the surrender
of 2 generals, 800 officers, and 14,700 troops. The 148th was the
only intact German division to surrender on that front.48 Although
they had little preparation and served under foreign command, against
a combat-experienced enemy, the "Smoking Cobras," as the
FEB was nicknamed, had shown, as one of their songs put it, the "fiber
of the Brazilian army" and the "grandeza de nossa gente"
[greatness of our peoplej.49American
leaders wanted the FEB to stay in Europe as part of the occupation
forces, but Brazilian military and civilian leaders rejected that
role. Unhappily, over American objections, the Brazilian government
decided to disband the FEB upon return to Brazil. The American military
had hoped that the division would be kept together to form the nucleus
for a complete reformation of the Brazilian army. FEB veterans would
slowly introduce the lessons of the war into the General Staff School
and Military School curricula. But the chance to use the FEB experience
to project Brazilian influence on the post-war world order was lost.
Those making the rapid decisions in late 1945 that led to the FEB's
demise could not know how quickly the United States would demobilize,
or how quickly the alliance with the Soviet Union would collapse.
Perhaps if Brazil had maintained occupation troops in Europe and a
standing cadre of combat-hardened troops at home, it would have had
a different post-war international position.ConclusionBrazil
took an active part ( MHIP : as a strategical Ally ) in World War
II as a supplier of strategic raw materials, as the site of important
air and naval bases, as a skillful supporter of the United States
in pan-American conferences, as a contributor of naval units, a combat
fighter squadron and a 25,000 strong infantry division.
It lost 1,889 soldiers and sailors, 31 merchant vessels, 3 warships,
and 22 fighter aircraft.
It came out of the war with modernized armed forces, thanks to
its receipt of 70% of all United States Lend-Lease equipment sent
to Latin America.Zé
Carioca, Walt Disney's dapper parrot, who was Hollywood's cartoon
characterization of Joe Brazilian, taught Donald Duck how to samba
in the film Three Caballeros, but the Americans, like Donald, could
not quite catch the beat.
So with the restoration of peace, instead of the wartime alliance
heralding an era of two national destinies bound together for mutual
benefit, as Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha had dreamed, the Cold
War turned Americans in other directions and left Brazilians with
a vague sense of having been exploited.
Brazil's rejection of further overseas military operations in the
Korean and Vietnam wars is partly related to a national perception
that the United States did not adequately appreciate its contribution
in World War II.Even
so, the war changed Brazil.
The wartime air and naval bases were turned into civilian airfields
and port facilities, the joint operations set new standards for military
education and training, and the experiences abroad that the thousands
of veterans brought back began a process of modernizing the nation's
mentality.
The industrialization spurred by the building of the Volta Redonda
steel mill propelled Brazil during a single generation from the age
of the bull-cart to that of the internal combustion engine.
Without the infrastructure, experiences, import-substitution processes,
and transfer of know-how acquired during the war, it is difficult
to imagine how Brazil would be today.50
It may not really matter whether the rest of the world knows what
Brazil did in World War II, but the Brazilians would be pleased if
it did, because they are legitimately proud of their multiple contributions
to Allied victory.ABBREVIATIONS
USED IN THE NOTES
ACS Army Chief of Staff
AGV Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC
AHMRE Arquivo Histórico do Ministério das Relapóes
Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro
AOA Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC
CDOC-EX Centro de Documenta~áo do Exército, Brasilia
CPDOC Centro de Pesquisa e Documentagáo de História
Contemporánea do Brasil, Fundagáo Getúlio Vargas,
Rio de Janeiro
DGFP Documents on German Foreign Policy
FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
FEB (BEF) Forga Expedicionária Brasileira
GS General Staff (U.S. Army)
MID Military Intelligence Division (U.S. Army)
MMB Modem Military Branch (U.S. Army)
NA National Archives, Washington
OPD Operations Plans Division, U.S. Department of War
RG Record Group
NOTES
1. Carmen Miranda, who was recruited in Rio by Broadway impresario
Lee Shubert to appear in the musical The Streets of Paris in 1939,
was acclaimed by The New York Times critic as the play's "most
magnetic personality." Twentieth-Century Fox sent a film crew
to New York and inserted a few scenes of her into its nearly ready
feature Down Argentine Way (with Betty Grable and Don Ameche; 1940).
Therefore her career in American films began with the replacement
of her Brazilian identity with a Hollywoodized Latin American one.
In 1945 she was the highest paid female entertainer in the Unites
States, but her roles told movie-goers little about her country. A
new documentary by prize-winning cinematographer Helena Solberg, Carmen
Miranda: Bananas Is My Business, examines her life and career. Walt
Disney went to Brazil as part of the propaganda efforts of the wartime
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Nelson Rockefeller,
director) and created the parrot Zé Carioca to symbolize Brazil.
The feisty bird still appears in Brazil on everything from newspaper
comic pages to T-shirts; a national symbol created by a foreigner.
Hitchcock's Notorious features footage of Rio street scenes, but the
stars' performances were superimposed on them in a studio. See Sergio
Augusto, "Hollywood Looks at Brazil: From Carmen Miranda to Moonraker",
in Randal Johnson & Robert Stam, eds., Brazilian Cinema (Austin:
Univ. of Texas Press, 1988), pp. 352-362. Given Brazil's wartime roles,
Rio was an odd choice of location, especially when the United States
was in the midst of securing cheap access to Brazil's ores. Luis Alberto
Moniz Bandeira provides insight into the post- war climate in his
Brasil-Estados Unidos: A Rivalidade Emergente (1950-1988) (Rio de
Janeiro: Ed. Civilizado Brasileira, 1989). At the time the Department
of State was concerned that Vargas might return to power and that
his resentment over United States involvement in his 1945 deposition
could influence his policies towards American interests; see Office
of Intelligence Research, Dept. of State, "An Estimate of the
Political Potential of Getúlio Vargas," Report No. 4324,
May 9, 1947, 097.3, Z1092, RG59, NA. Ira Levin's The Boys From Brazil
(New York: Random House, 1976) was also strangely timed. In it, he
told a story about the infamous Dr. Mengele, who during the war had
conducted cruel experiments on concentration camp prisoners, and who,
in the novel, cloned ninety-four babies from Hider's genes in his
laboratory in Paraguay in hopes of producing a new Fuhrer to "fulfill
the destiny of the Aryan race" (40). The novel implied that the
Nazi fugitives could move about openly in Brazil. Levin depicts a
neo-Nazi organization holding a dinner in a Florianópolis hotel,
complete with Swastica flags and Nazi uniforms, in January 1975 (188-195).
If such had occurred, it would have been featured on the front pages
of Brazilian and international newspapers. Curiously, at that time
U.S.-Brazilian relations had soured because the Carter Administration
was pressuring both Brazil and West Germany to drop their agreement
to build atomic plants in Brazil. See Norman Gall, "Atoms for
Brazil, Danger for All," Foreign Policy 23 (Summer 1976), pp.
44-77. The subsequent film of the same title located the action in
a generic tropical Latin country. Oddly, in the mid-1970s, according
to a conversation 1 had with U.S. Ambassador Robert White, who was
then in Paraguay, a neo-Nazi group did meet with banners displayed
at a rural hotel resort near Encarnación, which is in Paraguay.
Brazil had been under a military regime since 1964. The president
at the time was Ernesto Geisel (1974-79), a retired army general,
descendant of German immigrants, who was seeking to end military dominance
of the government. In World War II, he had prepared to go to Italy
by taking the special Brazilian course at the U.S. Army's Command
and General Staff School in early 1945. He did not go because the
Brazilian commitment was reduced from three to one combat division.
His rise to power marked the shift away from the repression of 1967-73
towards the path to elected, democratic government. His nationalist
stance on atomic energy and the Carter administration's misunderstanding
of the internal fight over human rights abuses led to a hardening
of attitudes and Geisel's abrogation of the military alliance with
the United States. For biographical information see my essay "Ernesto
Geisel," in David Eggenberger, ed., Encyc1opedia of World Biography
(McGraw-Hill, 1987), pp. 22-24.
2. General de Divisáo Francisco Ramos de Andrade Neves (Chief
of Staff), Rio de Janeiro, Aug. 3, 1934: Estado-Maior do Exército,
Exame da Situapdo Militar do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado-Maior
do Exército, 1934), Centro de Documentagáo do Exército,
Brasilia (CDOC-EX).
3. See, for example: Estado-Maior do Exército, 2a Grande Regiáo
Militar, Rio de Janeiro, n.d. Dec. 1936, Memo ##1 (Situado do Paiz),
Correspondéncia Pessoal, Acervo Pessoal Gen. Pedro de Góis
Monteiro, Caixa 1, Arquivo do Exército (Rio). It noted (in
section IV) that Brazil would not be able to maintain neutrality in
the event of a world conflict, that it would have to associate itself
with one of the sides, and that, because it lacked war materials,
its mobilization would provide soldiers that would have to be equipped
by another power, "which could not be other than the United States
of America."
4. An interesting analysis of the internal political situation is
in EME, 2a Grande Regiáo Militar, n.d. Jan. 1937, Memo #2 (Situagáo
do Paiz), Correspondéncia Pessoal, Acervo Pessoal Gen. Góis
Monteiro, Caixa XI, Arquivo do Exército. For 1932, see Stanley
E. Hilton, A Guerra Civil Brasileira (História da RevoluFio
Constitucionalista de 1932) (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1982).
For 1935, there are: Hélio Silva, 1935: A Revolta Vermelha
(Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilizapáo Brasileira, 1969); Dario Canale,
Francisco Viana, & José Tavares, Novembro de 1935: Meio
Século Depóis (Petrópolis: Ed. Vozes, 1985);
and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Estratégias da Ilusdo RevoluFdo
Mundial e o Brasil, 1922-1935 (Sáo Paulo: Companhia das Letras,
1991); and Robert M. Levine, who examined the turmoil coming from
both the left and the right in, The Vargas Regime:: The Critical Years,
1934-1938 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970). Following the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the opening of archives in Moscow has proven
that orders to rebel came from there; see "Os papéis de
Moscou, Documentos inéditos revelam a agá da Internacional
Comunista em 1935," Veja (Sáo Paulo), Sept. 8, 1993, pp.
58-60. The best study of the creation of the Estado Novo is Aspásia
Camargo, et al., O Golpe Silencioso: As Origens da República
Corporativa (Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo Ed., 1989).
5. Stanley E. Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939 (Austin:
Univ. of Texas Press, 1975), p. 140.
6. It should be observed that highly detailed reports from the Brazilian
embassy in Berlin located in the Arquivo Histórico do Ministério
das Relagóes Exteriores, Itamaraty Palace, Rio de Janeiro (AHMRE),
are a largely untapped source on Germany before and during the early
years of the war. They are especially useful because the Brazilian
diplomats felt less directly threatened by the Nazi regime than did
therr European and American counterparts.
7. There is detailed documentation on the Aski trade in the AHMRE:
see Carlos Alberto Gonpalves (2d Secretary), Memo: "O Intercámbio
de Alemanha com o Brasil," in Themistocles da Grapa Aranha (Counselor
of Embassy), Berlin, April 27, 1939, #152; Gongalves, Memo: "O
Cacau na Alemanha," in Grapa Aranha, Berlin, August 9, 1939,
#282; Gongalves, Memo: "A Borracha no Mercado Alemáo,"
in Grapa Aranha, Berlín, June 20, 1939, #210; Gongalves, Memo:
"A La na Alemanha," in Cyro de Freitas Valle (Ambassador),
Berlin, Sept. 9, 1939, #197, AHMRE. Typical of American views are
those in Jefferson Caffery (U.S. Ambassador to Brazil), Rio, May 6,
1938, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1938,
V, pp. 344-347; the importance that the Germans attached to trade
can be seen in U.S. Dept. of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy,
1918-1945, Series D, V (Washington: GPO, 1949- ), pp. 863-864, 874-875,
880-882, 886-889, 891-893 (hereafter DGFP). The Brazilian position
was stated by Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha in Aranha to Sumner
Welles, Rio, September 14, 1938, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha (AOA), Centro
de Pesquisa e Documentagáo Histórica Contemporánea
(CPDOC), Rio. I analyzed these issues more extensively in The Brazilian-American
Alliance, 1937-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973),
pp. 148-175.
8. Mario de Pimentel Brandáo to Oswaldo Aranha, Washington,
Nov. 8, 1938, AOA, CPDOC.
9. Jefferson Caffery to Cordell Hull, Rio, April 22, 1939, 832.00/1255,
RG59, National Archives (NA) Washington.
10. Auswártiges Amt to Kurt PrÜfer, Berlin, July 10, 1940,
DGFP, D, X, pp. 177-178.
11. DGFP, D, IX, pp. 499-501.
12. Cyro de Freitas Valle, Berlin, July 3, 1940, #238, AHMRE.
13. See McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 176-212; and
my essay "Brazil, the United States and the Second World War:
A Commentary," Diplomatic History 3, 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 59-76.
14. John D. Wirth, The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
15. McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 208-211.
16. Frank McCann, "Airlines and Bases: Aviation Diplomacy; The
United States and Brazil, 1939-1941," Inter-American Economic
Affairs, XXI, 4 (Spring 1968), pp. 35-50.
17. In addition to McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 213-239,
readers will find interesting a contemporary account by William A.M.
Burden, The Struggle for Airways in Latin America (New York, 1943),
and the U.S. Army's official history, Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild,
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (Washington, 1960). Researchers
will want to consult the manuscript "Official History of the
South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command," in the Amy's
Center for Military History in Washington.
18. Sumner Welles (Under-Secretary of State) to Norman Armour (U.S.
Ambassador to Argentina), Washington, July 7, 1942, 832.20/418, RG-59,
NA.
19. Cauby C. Araujo, the general counsel and later president of Panair
do Brasil, carried on these negotiations and organized the contruction
program. Details carne from an interview with him in Rio, Oct. 4,
1965. For description of the session at the Jan. 1942 Rio Conference
at which Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha announced the break, see
Jornal do Brasil (Rio), Jan. 29, 1942; and for the speech, see the
Brazilian "Green Book": Ministerio das Relaçoes Exteriores,
O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: MRE,
1944). Aranha later discussed the situation in his letter to Sumner
Welles, Vargem Alegre, May 24, 1945, AOA, CPDOC. For a fuller discussion,
see my The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 225-226, 256-257.
20. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1943 (Boston,
1964), p. 376. For the Brazilian navy, see Dino Willy Cozza, "A
Marinha do Brasil na II Grande Guerra," Revista do Exército
Brasileiro, Vol. 131, No.3 (Jul./Set. 1994), pp. 64-66; Herbert Campbell,
"A Marinha Mercante e a II Grande Guerra," ibid., pp. 71-77.
Campbell provides a listing and data on the ships sunk.
21. For troop strength and contemporary discussion, see "Official
History of the South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command"
(in Center for Military History, Washington), Part II, IV, 82; General
Eurico G. Dutra (Minister of War) to Ministers of State, Rio, Sept.
(n.d.) 1942, AGV, CPDOC.
22. U.S. Navy, "Commander South Atlantic Force, United States
Naval Administration in World War IV' Copy in U.S. Navy Library, Washington.
The author of this was historian Charles Nowell, then in navy service,
who was later at the University of Illinois.
23. On the war plans, see Chief of Staff General Pedro de Góes
Monteiro's account in, Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depóe
(Rio de Janeiro, 1956), pp. 382-384.
24. Alzira Vargas to Carlos Martins (Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S.),
Rio, Sept. 28, 1942, AGV, CPDOC. She told him that "O Patráo"
said to tell the Americans that "the steel mill cannot stop."
It was "essential for Brazil."
25. "Brazilian Trends," The Inter-American Monthly, II,
No. 7 (July 1943), pp. 43-44; "Brazil-A 20-Year Boost,"
Business Week (Nov. 18, 1942), p. 18; Vargas's speech entitled "O
Primeiro Lustro do Estado Nacional," Nov. 10, 1942, in Getúlio
Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1938-47),
IX, pp. 311-317; Jefferson Caffery (U.S. Ambassador to Brazil), Rio,
Nov. 6, 1942, 832.00/4314, RG-59, NA.
26. U.S. War Department, "Survey of the Rio de Janeiro Region
of Brazil," (S 30-772), Aug. 6, 1942, Vol. I; "Survey of
the Para Region of Brazil," (S 30-770), June 6, 1941, Vol. I.
27. Morris L. Cooke, Brazil on the March, A Study in International
Cooperation (New York, 1944). Morris Cooke and Joáo Alberto
Lins de Barros to F.D. Roosevelt and G. Vargas, n.p., Dec. 1, 1942,
Cooke Papers, 0283; Basic Economy Report, 1942-43, Box 1, OF 4512;
on the interior canal system, see Berent Friele to Cooke, n.p., Nov.
28, 1942, Cooke Papers, 0283, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDRL),
Hyde Park, N.Y.
28. For a discussion of these changes and their effects on politics,
see Leslie Bethell, "Brazil," in Leslie Bethell and Ian
Roxborough, eds., Latín American Between the Second World War
and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1992), pp. 40-41.
29. Aranha to Vargas, Rio, Jan. 25, 1943; Aranha to Dutra, Rio, Aug.1l,
1943, AOA, CPDOC.
30. Oswaldo Aranha to Eurico Dutra (Minister of War), Rio, Aug. l
l, 1943, AOA, CPDOC. He wrote this to Dutra, who was visiting the
U.S. to negotiate details of the FEB. He admitted that such a close
alliance carried dangers potentially incompatible with Brazilian sovereignty
and interests, but that it was the course with the fewest risks and
greatest security. It was a lesser evil and they would have to be
constantly vigilant to avoid pitfalls.
31. Ronald C. Newton, The `Nazi Menace' in Argentina, 1931- 1947 (Stanford:
Stanford Univ. Press, 1992), p. 299. He notes that the U. S. "artfully
generated" the Argentine "alarms of war with Brazil,"
which were increasing in "frequency and intensity" in 1943.
For Brazilian views of Argentina, see Gary Frank, Struggle for Hegemony
in South 55 America: Argentina, Brazil, and the United States during
the Second World War (Coral Gables: University of Miami, Center for
Advanced International Studies, 1979), pp. 45-60.
32. McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 349-353.
33. Carlos de Meira Mattos, O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua
época (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1983),
pp. 89-90; Meira Mattos comments to author, Rio, December 1991. The
other two divisions were to be led by Generals Newton Cavalcanti and
Heitor Borges.
34. The book was Democrito Cavalcanti de Anuda, et al., Depoimento
de Oficiais de Reserva Sóbre a F.E.B. (Rio de Janeiro: Cobraci
Publicagóes, 1949). On the number of reservists, see McCann,
The Brazilian-American Alliance, p. 368, n. 40.
35. J.B. Mascarenhas to E. Dutra, Cifrado #33-G.1, 7 Apr. 1945, Cifrados
FEB, de 15/9/44 a 5/ 7/45, 433.40, "1944/1945", MG665c,
CDOC-EX, Brasilia. He saw the FEB's prestige at stake. The Americans,
too, were concerned about junior officers. Mascarenhas's report as
commander of the 7th Mil. Region indicated a shortage of lieutenants
(165 authorized, but 123 on duty = 46 shortfall), Mascarenhas, "Relatorio...7RM,
l941" (Recife, 12 Feb. 1942), p. 25 in CDOC-EX, Brasilia. General
Ralph Wooten, who played a large role in relations with the Brazilians,
called General Dutra's attention "to the lack of leadership in
the lower officer and non-commissioned officer grades," suggesting
various remedies. MG Ralph H. Wooten to ACS OPD, Recife, 23 Jan. 1945,
"Resume of Situation in this Theater," OPD 336 Latin American
Section IV, Cases 80-93, RG 165, Modem Military Branch, NA.
36. Virginia Maria de Niemeyer Portocarrero, "A Mulher Brasileira
Apresentou-se Voluntar- iamente," Revista do Exército
Brasileiro, Vol. 131, No. 3 (Jul./Set. 1994), pp. 59-63.
37. For the recruitment data on the 7th Military Region, see Joáo
B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, "Relatório apresentado ao Exmo.
Sr. General de Divisáo Ministro de Guerra pelo General de Brigada
Joáo Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes Comandante da 7a. Regioo
Militar, Ano de 1941" (Recife, 12 Fevereiro de 1942), CDEX- Brasilia,
pp. 32-34. On FEB selection, see Lt. Col. Carlos Paiva GonQalves,
Selepdo Medica do Pessaol da F.E.B., Histórico, Funcionamento
e Dados Estatisticos (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército,
195 l), pp. 67-142. For American reports, see MG Ralph H. Wooten to
ACS OPD, Recife, 23 Jan. 1945, "Resume of Situation in this Theater,"
OPD 336 Latin American (Sec. IV) Cases 80-93; and Col. Charles B.B.
Bubb to Commanding General MTOUSA (Mediterranean Theater), Rio, 6
Dec. 1944, "Medical Report on the Fourth Echelon of the Brazilian
Expeditionary Force," OPD336.2 Brazil (Sec. IV), RG165, MMB,
NA. McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 369-372.
38. Gen. Eurico Dutra to Col. Edwin L. Sibert, Rio, 8 Jan. 1941, 2257
K18/247; and Col. Edwin L. Sibert to ACS G2, Rio, 18 Mar. 1941, No.
2650, "Student Officers from Brazil to US Service Schools,"
2257 K18/306, RG165, WD, GS, MID, NA. McCann, The Brazilian- American
Alliance, pp. 353-354, n. 18. By comparison, the Chinese sent 249
officers to Ft. Leavenworth, the British 208, the Venezuelans 73,
the Mexicans 60, and the Argentines 31. Command and General Staff
School Commander General Truesdell's comment about quality of Brazilian
officers was reported by Major General J.G. Ord in a speech to the
staff of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, August 11, 1944,
BDC 5400, RG218 (Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staft), NA.
39. Entries for 30-31 October 1944, Combat Diary, Report l/Inf. Div.
BEF, Center of Military History, Washington; José Alío
Piason, "Alguns Erros Fundamentais Observados na FEB," Depoimento
de Oficiais da Reserva, pp. 103-107. Piason was a subcommander of
one of the companies involved (3d Co. 1/6 IR). Mascarenhas, Memórias,
I, pp. 183-188. On an aerial observer's report of German build-up
prior to the action, see Elber de Mello Henriques, A FEB Doze Anos
Depois (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Biblioteca do Exército, 1959),
pp. 72-74. The most balanced account is Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco,
0 Brasil na II Grande Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército,
1960), pp. 206-214.
40. Floriano de Lima Brayner, A Verdade Sóbre a FEB: Memórias
de um Chiee de Estado- Maior, na Campanha da Itália, 1943-
1945 (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilizagáo Brasileira, 1968), p.
234.
41. William Waack, As duas faces da glória: A FEB vista pelos
seus aliados e inimigos (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1985).
The underlying tone of the book questions the importance of the FEB.
It is interesting that the Germana took it seriously enough to broadcast
a daily radio program called "Duro e Verde" over Radio Victoria
from near Como, Italy, that used two Brazilian nationals as commentators
- Margarida Hirschmann and Emilio Baldino, who were tried and given
jail sentences after the war. Daniels to Secretary of State, Rio,
Dec. 9, 1946, 832.203/12-946, RG 59, NA.
42. Emilio Varoli, "Aventuras de um prsonero na Alemanha Nazista,"
in Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva Sóbre a F.E.B., p. 447.
This contemporary participant account is at variance with Waack's
report that German veterans in the 1980s did not recall fighting Brazilians.
Unhappily, the pertinent German army records reportedly were destroyed
in a postwar fire.
43. A Manhd (Rio de Janeiro), Feb. 27, 1945. I visited the battlesite
in late Feb., 1994.
44. Waack concluded that because German veterans he interviewed decades
later did not remember a Monte Castello, it must have been insignificant;
see As Duas Faces, pp. 90-93; FEB Combat Diary, 35 entry for 21 February
1945 in "Report on the lst Infantry Division Brazilian Expeditionary
Forces in the Italian Campaign from 16 July 1944 to the Cessation
of Hostilities in May 1945," 301 (BEF)-033, NA.
45. It may be worth noting that this was the l0th Mountain Division's
"first major engagement with the enemy." "Fourth Corps
History," p. 512. In May 1994, Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, Chief
of Military History, U.S. Army, and General de Divisáo Sérgio
Ruschel Bergamaschi, Director of Cultural Matters, Brazilian Army,
led a joint American-Brazilian "Staff Ride" to retrace the
side-by-side campaigning of the l0th Mountain and the FEB; see Sérgio
Gomes Pereira, "A9áo conjunta 1 DIE (BR) / loa Div MTH
(EUA), Revista do Exército Brasileiro, Vol. 131, No. 3 (Jul./Set.
1994), pp. 54-56.
46. For a valuable discussion of the "school of the soldier,"
see Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second
World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 52-65.
47. Newton C. de Andrade Mello, A Epopéia de Montese (Curitiba:
Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1954).
48. The Brazilians completed this feat on their own and with considerable
pride waited until the surrender was complete and the prisoners under
guard before calling the American headquarters. Gen. Mascarenhas ordered
his men: "Only after the Germana are here we will inform the
Americana." Aspásia Camargo & Walder de Góes,
Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias
(Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1981), p. 368. Gen. Oswaldo Cordeiro
de Farias commanded the FEB artillery.
49. On the songs of the Febianos, see McCann, The Brazilian-American
Alliance, pp. 432,435; and the recording "20 Anos Depois: Expedicionarios
em Ritmos," Chantecler Records, Sáo Paulo, release CMG
2397, 1965.
50. The changes included such common things as ice cream. The popular
Kibon ice cream products appeared on the market in 1942. An American
company (Cia. U.S. Harkson do Brasil) fled Japanese occupied China
and set itself up in Brazil. Kibon comes from que bom, how good! "Ice
Cream in Brazil," Business Week (November 21, 1942), p. 24.
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